We show that every universally truthful randomized mechanism for combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations that provides an approximation ratio of m 1 2 − must use exponentially many value queries, where m is the number of items. In contrast, ignoring incentives there exist constant ratio approximation algorithms for this problem. Our approach is based on a novel direct hardness technique that completely skips the notoriously hard step of characterizing truthful mechanisms. The characterization step was the main obstacle for proving impossibility results in algorithmic mechanism design so far.
INTRODUCTION
This paper attempts to answer one of the earliest open questions in Algorithmic Mechanism Design: is there a truthful computationally-efficient mechanism for combinatorial * Supported by an Alfred P. Sloan Foundation Fellowship and a Microsoft Research New Faculty Fellowship.
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auctions with submodular bidders that provides a constant approximation ratio?
In a combinatorial auction there is a set M of items (|M | = m), and a set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of bidders. Each bidder i has a valuation function v i : 2 M → R + , which is normalized (vi(0) = 0) and non-decreasing. An important special case is when each valuation is submodular : for every item j and
bundles S and T , S ⊆ T , v(S ∪ {j}) − v(S) ≥ v(T ∪ {j}) − v(T ).
The definition captures valuations that exhibit "decreasing marginal utilities". The goal is to maximize the social welfare, i.e., to find an allocation (S1, . . . , Sn) that maximizes Σivi(Si). As in previous work, we would like our algorithms to run in time polynomial in the natural parameters of the problems, n and m. Since the valuation function is an object of exponential size, we assume that each valuation v is given to us as a black box that can only answer value queries: given S, return the value of v(S).
The main interest of this paper is in incentive-compatible algorithms that handle the selfish behavior of the bidders. We are interested in designing truthful algorithms in which the profit-maximizing strategy of each bidder is to reveal his true valuation (i.e., truthfully answer the queries).
the problem has received much attention, even from a pure optimization point of view, completely ignoring incentives. The most notable result here is Vondrak's celebrated algorithm [28] that provides an approximation ratio of e e−1 , improving over the 2-approximation of the greedy algorithm [22] . This ratio is the best possible with a polynomial number of value queries [19, 24] . While value queries are widely used in the design of algorithms for other optimization scenarios that involve submodular functions (see, e.g., [18, 17, 15] ), back in the combinatorial auctions setting, other algorithms guarantee improved approximation ratios using the stronger demand queries (given prices p 1 , . . . , p m , return a bundle that maximizes v(S) − Σj∈Spj). The state of the art in this setting is an ( e e−1 − 10 −4 )-approximation algorithm [16] , an improvement over the e e−1 -approximation algorithm of [12] .
Much less is known regarding the design of truthful algorithms for this problem. The VCG mechanism is a truthful algorithm for the problem, but requires computing the optimal solution and thus is not computable in polynomial time. The best known polynomial time deterministic algorithm provides a poor approximation ratio of O( √ m) [10] . Whether this ratio is the best possible with deterministic truthful polynomial-time algorithms is the subject of the current paper. If we provide the algorithm designer with more power and allow the use of both randomization and the strictly more powerful demand queries, an O(log m log log m)-truthful approximation algorithm exists [6, 11] . Yet, despite all progress made over the years, the algorithmic mechanism design community is unable to answer the question posed by Lehmann, Lehmann, and Nisan [22] 
Previous Technique: Characterize and Optimize
Roughly speaking, problems in Algorithmic Mechanism Design are either single parameter or multi-parameter. Single parameter problems, where the private information of each player consists of essentially one number, are quite well understood: an algorithm is truthful if and only if it is monotone (see [25] ). This characterization gives rise to many truthful algorithms with approximation ratios that match what is achievable by the best non-truthful polynomial time mechanisms (e.g., [23, 2, 4] ).
Combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders belong to the harder class of multi-parameter problems. In this class, the private information of each player consists of more than one parameter (for example, in combinatorial auctions the private information of a bidder consists of exponentially many values of bundles). Since the current best approximation ratios achievable by truthful polynomial time mechanisms are usually quite far from what can be obtained from a pure algorithmic point of view that ignores incentives, great effort was and is invested in proving impossibility results. The main obstacle in proving these impossibilities is the hardness of obtaining useful characterizations for multi-parameter domains. Specifically, all known impossibility results on the power of computationally-efficient truthful mechanisms are proved using the following twostage paradigm:
1. Characterize all truthful mechanisms for the setting, ignoring computational issues.
2.
Optimize over all truthful algorithms: i.e., show a lower bound on the approximation ratio of the best computationally efficient mechanism characterized in the previous step.
This paradigm was quite successful in obtaining impossibilities for problems with "full dimensionality" [20, 13, 26] : in the first characterization step, it is shown that all truthful mechanisms for the problems are VCG-based (a slight generalization of the VCG mechanism), regardless of their approximation ratio -thereby extending Roberts' theorem [27] 1 . The second optimization step shows that VCG-based algorithms cannot provide a good approximation ratio in polynomial time.
For combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations, the optimization step was accomplished in [8] where it was shown that every VCG-based m guarantee at best a trivial approximation ratio). Furthermore, as [9] shows, there are non-VCG-based mechanisms that guarantee arbitrarily good approximation ratios 2 ! Till now, [9] is the only example of a successful characterization of truthful mechanisms for a multi-parameter auction domain, and even there the extra assumption of scalability is needed. Moreover, the characterization of multi-unit auctions of [9] holds only for two bidders. While this suffices for obtaining an optimal inapproximability result for multiunit auctions, an optimal result for combinatorial auctions probably requires characterization of mechanisms for many bidders. This task seems to be quite difficult: we do not even have a good conjecture of what the class of mechanisms with good approximation ratios might be 3 .
Our Results: Impossibilities via Direct Hardness
This paper introduces a simple technique for bounding the power of truthful mechanisms. The technique is very different from the characterize-and-optimize approach, and in particular does not require obtaining characterizations of truthful mechanisms at all. The starting point is the taxation principle: consider some player i, and fix the valuations of all other players. According to the taxation principle, in a truthful algorithm each bundle S has a price p S (possibly ∞) and bidder i is assigned the bundle that maximizes his profit v(S) − pS. We call this set of bundles and prices the menu of player i. We show that in any algorithm that provides a good approximation there exist valuations such that some bidder faces a "large" menu with a "nice" structure. We then prove that selecting the profit maximizing bundle in the menu -a must according to the taxation principlerequires exponentially many value queries. This leads us to the statement of our main result:
Theorem: Let A be a randomized universally truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders that provides an approximation ratio of m 1 2 − , for some constant > 0. Then, A makes exponentially many value queries.
Notice that our result holds not only for deterministic mechanisms but also for universally truthful mechanisms (i.e., a probability distribution over truthful deterministic mechanisms). This is yet another benefit of skipping the characterization step and using our direct hardness approach.
Flexible Combinatorial Public Projects
We then proceed to show the applicability of our techniques in other domains. Papadimitriou et al. [26] presented the combinatorial public project problem. Similarly to a combinatorial auction, there are m items and n players with monotone and normalized submodular valuations. Unlike combinatorial auctions the goal is to find a single bundle S of size exactly k that maximizes Σivi(S). A simple greedy algorithm provides an approximation ratio of − on the approximation ratio of truthful polynomial time algorithms: they first show that all truthful algorithms for the problem are VCGbased, and then that VCG-based algorithms cannot provide a good approximation ratio in polynomial time. However, a natural relaxation of the problem allows outputting bundles of size at most k (the flexible model) rather than bundles of size exactly k (the exact model). While this relaxation is useless from a pure algorithmic point of view, since the valuations are monotone, there might be truthful non-VCG based mechanisms in the flexible domain, thus bypassing the characterization and impossibility result of [26] 4 . To the very least, characterizing truthful mechanisms in the flexible model seem to require new techniques. Our direct hardness approach allows us to ignore all these complications and obtain the following:
Theorem: Let A be a randomized universally truthful mechanism for flexible combinatorial public projects that provides an approximation ratio of m 1 2 − , for some constant > 0. Then, A makes exponentially many value queries.
Hardness of Truthful in Expectation Mechanisms
As there has been only limited success in designing powerful deterministic and universally truthful mechanisms for many domains, there is a line of research [1, 21, 5, 7] that advocates the use of a relaxed notion of truthfulness, truthfulness in expectation. In a truthful-in-expectation mechanism, truth telling maximizes the expected profit, where the expectation is taken over the internal random coins of the algorithm. Truthfulness in expectation is a reasonable relaxation of deterministic truthfulness, but one should keep in mind that it should be used only if bidders are known to be risk neutral and not, for example, risk averse (in contrast to universally truthful mechanisms, see [11] for a discussion). It is known that in some settings truthfulness in expectation is strictly stronger than deterministic truthfulness [7] . Can truthfulness in expectation be the remedy for all pitfalls of deterministic truthfulness? Unfortunately, we give a negative answer:
Theorem: Let A be a randomized truthful-in-expectation mechanism for exact combinatorial public projects that provides an approximation ratio of m 1 2 − , for some constant > 0. Then, A makes exponentially many value queries. This is the first lower bound on the power of polynomial time truthful-in-expectation mechanisms in any setting. We again prove an impossibility without a characterization
5 . Yet, exact combinatorial public projects have a somewhat artificial flavor in our opinion, especially in a randomized setting 6 . We currently do not know how to extend our result, and whether there exists an efficient truthful-in-expectation mechanism with a good approximation ratio in the flexible model remains an open question.
Open Questions
This paper shows that every universally truthful randomized mechanism for combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations with an approximation ratio of m 1 2 − makes an exponential number of value queries. This was achieved by introducing a novel approach that allows proving hardness without characterization. Nevertheless, a full characterization of truthful mechanisms with good approximation ratio remains an important question, even ignoring computational implications.
If demand queries are allowed, there exists a randomized universally-truthful O(log m log log m)-approximation algorithm [6] . Is there an m 1 2 − deterministic algorithm that uses a polynomial number of demand queries? A truthfulin-expectation O(1)-approximation mechanism that uses demand queries 7 , or even a universally truthful one? Another open question is to prove hardness results that are based on computational complexity rather than on concrete complexity for, say, the budget additive case (see [26, 3] ). These questions remain open, but we do believe that a refinement of our direct-hardness technique might be capable of making significant progress in providing answers.
Paper Organization
Section 2 is the preliminaries section. Section 3 contains our main result: an impossibility result for truthful polynomial time combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations. The subject of Section 4 is an impossibility result for combinatorial public projects. Finally, in Section 5 we discuss truthful in expectation mechanisms for exact combinatorial public projects.
PRELIMINARIES

The Settings
Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Valuations
In a combinatorial auction there is a set M of items (|M | = m) and a set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of bidders. Each bidder i has a valuation function vi : 2 M → R + , which is normalized (v i (∅) = 0) and non-decreasing. We assume that the valuations are submodular: a valuation v is submodular if it exhibits decreasing marginal utilities,
for every item j and bundles S, T , S ⊆ T . Equivalently, v(S) + v(T ) ≥ v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ), for every two bundles S and T . A special case of submodular valuations is additive valuations: a valuation is additive if for every bundle S, v(S) = Σ j∈S v({j}).
Let V be the set of all submodular valuations. An allocation of the items S = (S1, . . . , Sn) is a vector of pairwise disjoint of subsets of M . Let S be the set of all allocations. The goal is to find an allocation that maximizes the welfare:
The valuations are given as black boxes. We assume that the black box v is accessed only via value queries: given a bundle S, return v(S). We want our algorithms to make a polynomial number (in n and m) of value queries to the black boxes.
Combinatorial Public Projects
In a combinatorial public project, as in combinatorial auctions, we also have a set M of items (|M | = m), and a set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of bidders. Similarly, each bidder i has a valuation function v i : 2 M → R + , which is normalized (v i (∅) = 0), non-decreasing and submodular. The valuations are given as black boxes that can only answer value queries. In exact combinatorial public projects (this is the model defined in [26] ) the goal is to find a bundle S of size exactly k that maximizes Σ i v i (S). In flexible combinatorial public projects we are allowed to output S of size at most k that maximizes Σivi(S). We are interested in algorithms that make a polynomial number (in n and m) of value queries.
Truthfulness
The reader is referred to [25] for the (standard) proofs missing in this subsection. An n-bidder mechanism is a pair (A, p) where A :
It is well known that an algorithm (for combinatorial auctions or combinatorial public projects) is truthful if and only if each bidder is presented with a payment for each bundle T that does not depend on bidder i's valuation (i.e., p (i) :
T (v−i). Each bidder is allocated a bundle that maximizes his profit:
T (v −i ) (this is called the "taxation principle" -we will sometimes say that these payments are induced by v −i ).
Definition 2.2 (Menu). Fix some algorithm
Observe that shifting all prices in the menu by the same constant without does not the allocation, since the set of profit-maximizing bundles of each bidder remains the same. Therefore, fixing the other bidders' valuations, we normalize the price of the bundle that bidder i gets when his valuation is identically 0 to be zero. In combinatorial auctions we assume for convenience and without loss of generality that this is the empty bundle (if the bidder gets some other bundle S we set the price of both S and the empty bundle to be 0 and use tie breaking, if needed, so that the bidder prefers S over the empty bundle). In combinatorial public projects S might not be the empty bundle but some other bundle.
Randomized Mechanisms
Definition 2.3. (A, p) is universally truthful if it is a probability distribution over truthful deterministic mechanisms.
, where the expectation is over the internal random coins of the algorithm.
Chernoff Bounds
We will use the following version of the chernoff bounds multiple times. 
THE MAIN RESULT: COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS WITH SUBMODULAR VALUATIONS
We start with proving a lower bound on deterministic mechanisms. Later we discuss how to extend the lower bound to randomized universally truthful algorithms (Theorem 3.16). In particular, for any constant > 0 and n = m 1 2 − , we get that A must make an exponential number of value queries to achieve an approximation ratio better than O(m 1 2 − ). The proof shows that for some v i and some valuations of the other bidders v −i , finding the bundle that maximizes the profit of bidder i vi(S) − p v −i (S) requires an exponential number of value queries. The proof is divided into two parts. In the first part (Section 3.1) we show that there are valuations v −i that induce a submenu with "nice" properties. In the second part (Section 3.2) we use the submenu to define a valuation vi of bidder i such that finding the profitmaximizing bundle for v i requires an exponential number of value queries.
Specifically, the first step shows that for some v −i the menu of bidder i is exponentially large. This by itself is not enough; the profit-maximizing bundle may sometimes be found with only a polynomial number of value queries even in exponentially large menus. Therefore, we find a "large" submenu where the bundles' prices are "almost the same" with the additional property that if a bundle T is in the submenu, then every other bundle U in the menu that contains T has a "significantly" higher price. These two properties, together with other easier-to-show properties, enable us to construct a valuation vi for which finding the profit-maximizing bundle requires exponentially many value queries.
Definition 3.2 (Structured Submenu). A set S ⊆ Rv −i is structured if
• For each S, S ∈ S: |p S (v
−i ) − p S (v −i )| ≤ 1 m 5 .
• For all S, T such that S ∈ S, T ∈ R v −i and T strictly contains S: p T (v
• For each S, S ∈ S: |S| = |S |.
Existence of Exponentially Large
Structured Submenus Throughout the proof we assume that m ≥ n 2 since otherwise the statement of the lemma only guarantees that A makes at least one query, which is trivially true for every algorithm with a finite approximation ratio. The proof makes use of the following class of valuations:
. A valuation v is called polar additive if both of the following conditions hold:
• v is additive.
We show that there exists v −i that consists of polar additive valuations only, and that the induced menu of v −i contains a structured submenu of at least the specified size. We use the probabilistic method to prove the existence of such v i . The valuation v i of bidder i is constructed as follows: for each item j, set independently at random v i (j) = 1 with probability p = 1 n , or v i (j) = 1 m 3 with probability 1 − p. We call valuations constructed this way random. We say that item j is demanded by bidder i if vi({j}) = 1. 
For each S that is strictly contained in T ∈ R v
The first property holds since otherwise bidder i with valuation v i has negative profit for S and thus prefers the empty bundle (which has a profit of zero). The second property holds since the marginal value of every item in a polar additive valuation is at least 
Proof. Fix some item j. The probability that this item is demanded by no bidder is exactly (1−p) n . By the chernoff bounds and using p = . Let v i be a random polar-additive valuation. With probability at least
Proof. The probability that item j ∈ S is demanded by bidder i is p. By the chernoff bounds, the probability that more than 2p|S| of the items will be demanded by bidder i is at most e −p|S| . The contribution of items that are not demanded by i is at most m · 
Assume towards a contradiction that for each bidder i and . The welfare of (A 1 , . . . , A n ) is:
where we use the fact that all events C i S occur to bound the contribution of A i 's in C by 
, where x is an integer. There are m 6 bins, since for each S ∈ Sv −i we have that 0 ≤ pS(v−i) ≤ m and the size of each bundle is at most m. Let S be the set of size at least Sv −i m 6 that consists of all bundles in the most congested bin. Notice that S is a structured submenu. This follows by Claim 3.6 and because all bundles in S are in the same bin: the price difference between every two bundles in the same bin is at most m −5 and all bundles in the same bin have the same size. 
The Optimization Lemma
is non-decreasing and submodular.
Proof. One can easily verify that v
is non-decreasing. We now show that all marginal values are non-increasing, hence the valuation is submodular. I.e., v
We divide the analysis into two simple cases:
• |S ∪{j}| ≤ k: For every T , we have that v • |S ∪ {j}| > k: by the previous bullet we are left with considering bundles T such that The last case we have to consider is when v
Consider adding items from (S \ T ) ∪ {j} one after the other in some arbitrary order. The marginal value of any additional item is either half of the marginal value of the previous item (if the value of the new bundle is determined according to the fourth case in the definition of v S * i ), exactly the marginal value of the previous item (if the value is k · t for the first time) or 0 (if we already had a bundle with value k · t). In either cases the marginal value does not increase, as needed. then S * is his profit-maximizing bundle. It is obvious that by choosing a large enough value of t a bundle of size at least k will maximize the profit. We use the properties of a structured menu to show that S * will be maximize the profit, and not some other bundle. The proof consists of the following series of simple claims.
Below we show that when bidder i's valuation is v
Proof. It suffices to show that
The claim now follows since by the properties of a structured submenu
, for every bundle S such that |S| > k where there exists some T ∈ S such that T ⊆ S.
To finish the proof we show that pv −i (S) > pv −i (S * ). By the properties of structured submenu, since S contains some set in S, we have that 
Impossibility Results for Randomized Universally Truthful Mechanisms
We briefly sketch how to obtain impossibility results for randomized universally truthful randomized mechanisms. We use ideas introduced in [8, 7] . Instead of working with randomized mechanisms that provide a good approximation ratio on all inputs, it will be easier to work with deterministic mechanisms that provide a good approximation ratio on "many" inputs. A reduction in this spirit can be obtained as follows: [8, 7] ). Let U be some finite set of instances, and let γ > α ≥ 1. Let A be a universally truthful mechanism that provides an expected welfare of
for every instance I ∈ U with expected number of value queries val(A). Let α = We would like to prove that every universally truthful randomized n 10 -approximation mechanism for combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations must make an exponential number of value queries. Let U be the set of of all instances where every valuation is polar additive. From the proposition, using γ = 2α, τ = 2, we have that there exists a (4α, 1 α )-good algorithm A on U that makes 2α · val(A) value queries. We will a lower bound on the number of value queries A must make, hence we also bound the number of queries A makes. This will conclude the proof.
We now show the existence of an exponentially large structured submenu in A . We modify the proof of Lemma 3.3 as follows. Let W be the event that A provides an approximation ratio of αm m−α on the random instance. Observe that since A is (4α, 10n 2 ·m 6 is a lower bound on the number of value queries that A makes. This implies that the number of value queries of the randomized algorithm A makes is as specified.
FLEXIBLE COMBINATORIAL PUBLIC PROJECTS
We show that every randomized universally truthful algorithm for flexible combinatorial public projects that achieves an approximation ratio of m 1 2 − requires an exponential number of value queries. The proof is a simpler version of the result for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders. We highly recommend reading Section 3 first. We prove the result for deterministic mechanisms. A lower bound of m 1 2 − for randomized universally truthful mechanisms may be obtained as in Section 3.3. From now on let the number of items selected in the problem to be √ m. The proof consists of the following lemmas. Proof. We prove the result for the special case where we fix some bidder i and set all v ∈ v−i to be identically zero (i.e., for every S and v ∈ v−i, v(S) = 0). A random polar-additive valuation v is now constructed as follows: for each item j, set independently at random v i (j) = 1 with probability p = Thus there is an instance where all the events defined above occur simultaneously. Let S be the set that the algorithm outputs in this instance. By definition S ∈ S. Since the event C S occurs we have that the welfare that the algorithm provides is at most m . On the other hand, the optimal solution has a value of at least √ m 2
, since event O occurs. Thus the algorithm provides an approximation ratio worse than m 1 2 − for this instance, a contradiction.
We now specify the structured submenu with the required size. Take S of size at least The proof of the following lemma is identical to the proof of Lemma 3.10: 
TRUTHFUL IN EXPECTATION MECHANISMS FOR EXACT CPP
This section shows that any truthful in expectation mechanisms for exact combinatorial public projects that guarantees an approximation ratio better than m 1 2 − requires an exponential number of value queries. This is the first lower bound on the power of polynomial time truthful in expectation mechanisms in any setting. We fix the number of items selected in the problem to be √ m. We observe that in a truthful in expectation mechanism, prices are given to distributions and not to bundles 8 . 
